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MINISTERIAL PERMITS AND DUE PROCESS:
MINISTER OF MANPOWER AND
IMMIGRATION v. HARDA YAL
By JOHN HUCKER*
Since 1972, no provision has existed in Canadian immigration law for
a person originally admitted to Canada as a non-immigrant to adjust his status
within Canada to that of a landed immigrant.' Cases continually arise, how-
ever, where a visitor to Canada decides that he would like to stay permanently
in this country. A procedure has therefore been developed under which the
person concerned may be "landed" by means of the passing of a special
Order-in-Council. 2 This is a cumbersome procedure that can take several
months to complete, and it is used most frequently when the person's applica-
tion is sponsored by a spouse who is herself or himself a Canadian citizen
or permanent resident.
Mr. Latchman Hardayal entered Canada as a non-immigrant. On June
2, 1975 he applied at the Canada Immigration Centre in Kitchener, Ontario,
to become a landed immigrant. His application was sponsored by his Cana-
dian-born wife. Upon receipt of the application, a Minister's permit was issued
to Mr. Hardayal, authorizing him to remain for a period of twelve months.
In the normal course of events, this would have tided Mr. Hardayal over until
the Order-in-Council procedure had been completed. The marriage between
the Hardayals apparently encountered difficulties, however, and the parties
ceased living together. On March 25, 1976, Mr. Hardayal received a letter
from the Officer-in-Charge of the Kitchener Immigration Centre to the follow-
ing effect:
Dear Mr. Hardayal:
Whereas pursuant to subsection (1) of Section 8 of the Immigration Act, a
permit was issued on June 11, 1975, authorizing you to remain in Canada until
10th June, 1976.
Take notice that pursuant to subsection (3) of Section 8 of the said Act,
I hereby cancel the said permit, I having been authorized by the Minister of Man-
power and Immigration pursuant to Section 2 and Section 67 of the Act to cancel
such Permits.2
Together with this notice of cancellation came a second communication
notifying Mr. Hardayal that, since he and his wife were no longer living as a
married couple, the Department had terminated the processing of the applica-
0 Copyright, 1978, J. Hucker.
Mr. Hucker is a member of the Ontario Bar.
1 On November 6, 1972, S.O.R./62-36, as amended by S.O.R./67-434, was revoked
by S.O.R./72-443. See J. Hucker, Synopsis of Canadian Immigration Law (1975), 3
Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Comm. 47 at 50.
2 See Hucker, supra note 1, at 58-60.
3 Minister of Manpower and Immigration v. Hardayal (1977), 75 D.L.R. (3d) 465
at 467 (S.C.C.).
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tion for landing. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hardayal filed an application before
the Federal Court of Appeal seeking an order setting aside the cancellation
of the Minister's permit.4 The main argument used by Mr. Hardayal in sup-
port of his application was that he had been given no reason for the cancel-
lation beyond the reference to the fact of marriage breakdown, nor had he
received an opportunity to make representations to the Minister prior to this
step being taken.
In a majority decision, 5 the Federal Court of Appeal granted the applica-
tion. In his reasons for judgment, Mr. Justice Urie distinguished between the
issuing of a permit, which was admittedly a purely administrative function,
and the cancellation, which he found to be a decision that required certain
quasi-judicial safeguards. Focusing first on section 8 of the Immigration Act,6
the provision that deals with permits, the Court acknowledged that there was
nothing in the section itself that expressly or impliedly suggested that a hear-
ing of some kind should be involved in any part of the decision-making pro-
cess, but continued:
That, however, does not end the matter since it may be that where, as here, it is
proposed that a permit which expressly grants to the holder certain rights from
which other benefits naturally flow, is to be cancelled, the statute may imply that
there be such a "hearing" because fairness requires that the permit holder not be
deprived of those rights and benefits without an opportunity to make submissions.7
The Federal Court neatly sidestepped the Supreme Court of Canada
decision in Howarth v. National Parole Board s where it had been unsuccess-
fully argued that the granting or revocation of parole should be accompanied
by minimum procedural safeguards of a quasi-judicial nature. Concluding that
"a paroled inmate remains an inmate," Urie J. went on to draw a distinction:
An alien with a Minister's permit, on the other hand, acquires a new status under
s.s. 7(2) of the Immigration Act, the status of a non-immigrant for the period
limited by the permit. This status carries with it very substantial advantages, in-
cluding freedom from the possibility of deportation while the permit remains valid,
advantages which the permit holder has a reasonable expectation of retaining
during the period designated in the permit....
... A cancellation which will deprive him of these expectations without per-
mitting him to make representations in respect of the proposed cancellation (the
reason given for which may be based on erroneous information) seems to me to
lack the element of fairness. It follows then that the failure to give the applicant
in this case a reasonable opportunity to make representations constitutes a denial
of a principle of natural justice, and, accordingly, the s. 28 application should
be granted .... 9
The judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal in Hardayal no doubt
landed as a bombshell in the Department of Manpower and Immigration,
where several thousand Minister's permits are issued each year to a variety
4 Re Hardayal and Minister of Manpower and Immigraiton, [1976] 2 F.C.R. 746,
67 D.L.R. (3d) 738.
5 Per Urie and Ryan J.; MacKay D.J dissenting.
6 R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-2.
7 Supra note 4, at 750 (F.C.R.), 741 (D.L.R.).
8 [1976] 1 S.C.R. 453, (1974), 50 D.L.R. (3d) 349.
9 Supra note 4, at 752 (F.C.R.), 743 (D.L.R.).
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of persons with one feature in common-these people cannot otherwise
enter Canada under the provisions of the Immigration Act.10 Permits have
been used to authorize the temporary admission of persons with criminal
records, those who are legally barred for medical reasons, as well as pro-
spective immigrants whose examination overseas (including any necessary
security checks) have not been completed, but whose movements from their
countries of origin may need to be expedited-political opponents of the pre-
sent regime in Chile are an example of the latter category.
Following the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal, the Department
sought leave to appeal from the Supreme Court of Canada. In support of its
contention that the present case involved a question of law of national im-
portance which should be resolved by the Court, the Department filed an
affidavit signed by its Deputy Minister, Alan E. Gotlieb, informing the Court
that 4,000 Minister's permits had been issued in the year 1975, 900 of them
in circumstances similar to those pertaining to Mr. Hardayal." The affidavit
asserted that the issuance of Minister's permits introduced an element of
flexibility and humanitarianism into the administration of immigration law,
and implied that the Federal Court's decision had turned the Minister's permit
into a two-edged sword. Rather than face possible challenges that could
block prompt cancellation, the Immigration Department might in many in-
stances prefer not to issue permits in the first place. The result would be to
harm rather than to assist persons who would otherwise have their entry or
stay in Canada facilitated.
With this information before it, the Supreme Court granted leave, and
ultimately upheld the appeal of the Department in a unanimous opinion de-
livered by Mr. Justice Spence. Both parties having agreed that the issuing of
a permit was a purely administrative act, the Court soon concluded that the
decision of the Minister to cancel a permit was also an order of an adminis-
trative nature within the meaning of section 28 of the Federal Court Act.12
The sole issue left to be determined was whether, in the language of section
28(1), the Minister's decision to cancel was one that was "required by law
to be made on a judicial or quasi-judicial basis." In ruling that it was not,
Spence J. observed:
Having regard for the detailed directions as to permitting entry of immigrants and
as to the refusal to permit entry, or the deportation of those who have entered
Canada, set out in the many provisions of the Immigration Act, I am strongly of
the view that the Minister's power under s. 8 of the Immigration Act to grant, to
extend, or cancel a permit with no direction as to the method which is to be used
in the exercise of the power and, for the present purposes, no limitation on the
persons who may be the subject of such permits, was intended to be purely ad-
ministrative and not to be carried out in any judicial or quasi-judicial manner,
and that, in fact, to require such permit, to be granted, extended or cancelled only
in the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function would defeat Parliament's
purpose in granting the power to the Minister. As I have said, the evidence indi-
cates that the power is only used in exceptional circumstances and chiefly for
humanitarian purposes. Such power was, in the opinion of Parliament, necessary
10 See generally, Hucker, supra note 1, at 58-63.
1 Supra note 3, at 469.
12 R.S.C. 1970, (2d Supp.) c. 10.
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to give flexibility to the administration of the immigration policy, and I cannot
conclude that Parliament intended that the exercise of the power be subject to any
such right of a fair hearing as was advanced by the respondent in this case.18
The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court showed the unwillingness
of that body to impose additional procedural requirements upon the statutory
scheme of the Immigration Act. The result will be small comfort to anyone
who saw in Hardayal the possibility of piercing the Immigration Department's
bureaucratic veil. However, particularly in the light of its earlier decision in
Prata,14 the approach adopted was entirely predictable. In that case, the
Supreme Court, again in a unanimous judgment, had upheld the right of the
Minister of Manpower and Immigration and the Solicitor General to file a
certificate under section 21 of the Immigration Appeal Board Act,'8 thereby
precluding the Immigration Appeal Board from exercising its discretionary,
humanitarian jurisdiction' 6 in favour of the appellant. The latter argued un-
successfully that by denying him an opportunity to be heard and to answer
any allegations contained in the confidential police reports, upon which the
section 21 certificate was based, the Ministers had offended the principles
of natural justice.17
The Hardayal decision also signalled that Canada's highest judicial body
is not prepared to follow the path opened by the English Court of Appeal in
a similar immigration context. In Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home
Affairs,'8 Lord Denning M.R. had held that an individual whose permit to
remain in England was revoked before its time limit expired was entitled to
an opportunity to make representations. Such an opportunity was needed to
protect the applicant's "legitimate expectation" that he would be allowed to
stay for the permitted time.
Even if the reasoning of the Master of the Rolls is accepted, it is strongly
arguable on the particular facts of Hardayal that the respondent's expectation
was that he would be allowed to remain in Canada as a permit holder only
while his application for landing was being processed. Since this application
was itself dependent upon a marital relationship that had subsequently
broken down, it could hardly have come as a total surprise to Mr. Hardayal
when his interim status was terminated. As already noted, permits are issued
in a variety of situations for differing periods, sometimes for only a few days
or weeks. Ordinarily there would seem to be no reason why an individual
should not be alerted to the fact that his permit is to be cancelled; presumably
such an occurrence is fairly rare. However, this does not necessarily mean
that a "hearing" in any formal sense is warranted. Since by definition the
individual so affected is inadmissible to Canada, he would not appear to be
18 Supra note 3, at 471.
14Prata v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 376, (1975),
52 D.L.R. (3d) 383.
15 R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-3.
16 Id., s. 15.
17 See Comment (1975), 53 Can. B. Rev. 810.
18 [1969] 2 Ch. 149. Cited with approval by Urie J. in Re Hardayal, supra note 4,
at 741-42 (F.C.R.).
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in a particularly strong position to argue for this additional safeguard. I do
not mean to suggest that official arbitrariness should be countenanced or
hidden from scrutiny, but merely that an increased formalism in decision
making is not necessarily the best answer.
In part, the Hardayal case can be seen as an effort to call the Immigra-
tion Department to account for the exercise of its undoubtedly significant
powers. During the debates in Parliament and elsewhere on the Immigration
Act 197619 (proclaimed in force April 10, 1978), a frequently-voiced
theme was concern over the perceived arbitrariness of immigration proce-
dures.20 In many respects, the new Act goes beyond its predecessor in defining
and circumscribing the powers of officials, but one searches the legislation in
vain to ascertain how, and under what circumstances, one may apply for a
Minister's permit: the authority of the Minister and his officials in this regard
is left undefined.21 Similarly, there is no indication of the circumstances, if
any, under which one can apply from within Canada to become a permanent
resident. Since it is unlikely that a total ban on applications for landing will
be implemented, one must assume that procedures-albeit of a purely ad-
ministrative nature-will continue in effect. However, the aura of mystery
surrounding this murky area of the law remains, thereby encouraging suspi-
cion-whether justified or not-about the criteria upon which the Minister
or his officials base their decisions.
It is suggested that the Hardayal case is not particularly significant in
terms of the legal issues presented. Confronted with a clear statutory scheme,
together with an explanation of its rationale and an implied warning that
judicial remodelling could have untoward effects, the Supreme Court opted
for caution. Commentators who suggest that the classification of functions
into administrative or quasi-judicial should not be the sole test in deciding
whether natural justice concepts are applicable 2 will probably be vindicated
with the passage of time. However, Minister of Manpower and Immigra-
tion v. Hardayal was, on its facts, an unlikely candidate to prompt the dis-
carding of prevailing orthodoxy.
19 S.C. 1976, c. 52.
20 Can. H. of C. Standing Committee on Labour, Manpower and Immigration,
Proceedings, No. 32 (June 7, 1977) respecting Bill C-24. The Committee's hearings
spanned a considerable time period. Particularly interesting were submissions by the
Committee from Parkdale Community Legal Services.
21 Supra note 19, s. 19.
22 For example, D. Mullan, Fairness: the New Natural Justice? (1975), 25 U. of T.
L.J. 281.
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